





Thought Experiments, Hypotheses, 
and Cognitive Dimension of Literary Fiction
Abstract
Some authors defend literary cognitivism – the view that literary fiction is cognitively valu­
able – by drawing an analogy between cognitive values of thought experiments and literary 
fiction. In this paper my aim is to analyse the reasons for drawing this analogy and to see 
how far the analogy can be stretched. In the second part, I turn to the claim put forward by 
literary anti­cognitivists according to which literature can at best be the source of hypoth­
eses, not of knowledge. I challenge this claim by showing that hypotheses can have valuable 














of	 cognitive	benefits	 and	 cognitive	 contribution	of	 literature	 –	 I	 think	we	

































substance	and	developed	 through	 their	different	 aspects.	For	example,	
many critics argue that Dickens’ Hard Times can be read as calling into 
question the principle of utilitarianism.

























what	 it	 is	 that	gives	 strength	 to	 these	cognitive	contributions,	 that	 is,	what	























“The	suggestion	then,	 is	 that	 the	mental	models	through	which	readers	comprehend	fictional	
narratives	also	provide,	 through	their	mobilization	of	 tacit	or	unarticulated	knowledge	of	 the	
world,	 a	means	of	 testing	 those	claims	 to	knowledge	of	 the	actual	world	 that	 theorists	have	
located	in	fictional	narratives,	and	thereby	validate	the	idea	that	fiction	can	be	a	genuine	source	
of	knowledge	of	the	world.”7
Given	 that	 according	 to	 this	model	we	 expand	our	 knowledge	 by	 creating	
mental	models	that	operate	with	the	knowledge	we	already	have,	that	is,	cog-















2. Literature as thought experiment
Davies is not alone in his claim that literature can function as extended TE. 
Noël	Carroll,	a	well	devoted	defender	of	literary	cognitivism,	claims	that































known	 to	 the	question	at	hand	by	refocusing	 that	knowledge	 in	a	novel	way.	This	counts	as	
knowledge	productions,	because	it	clarifies	linkages	between	parts	of	our	cognitive	map”.11
Apart	from	that,	they	can	also	raise	counterexamples	to	well	accepted	theo-
ries,	 make	 argumentative	 points,	 motivate	 conceptual	 distinction	 and	 give	
counterexamples	to	widely	accepted	claims.	All	of	these	functions	can,	Car-
roll	claims	and	I	concur,	be	carried	out	by	literary	fiction.
One  of  the  strongest  formulations  of  the  analogy  comes  from  Daniel  Do-
hrn,	who	claims	that	the	process	of	interpretation	is	close	to	counterfactual	























































the	no-fidelity	constraint.	These	are	two	footholds	of	fictive utterance theory 
of fictionality,	according	to	which,	for	some	narrative	to	be	fictional,	the	at-











































































































utopias and dystopias. Examples  that come  to mind are Brave New World,	
1984,	The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,	The Island of Dr. Moreau, 
Herland, The Female Man,	etc.	Precondition	of	making	sense	of	these	works	
is	the	awareness	of	the	fact	that	such	scenarios	have	not	been	enacted,	that	is,	
at the time21	these	fictional	stories	were	written,	these	scenarios	were	fictional.	


































stories	were	written’,	 a	 good	 explanation	of	








enact	 these	procedures	 in	 the	 real	world.	To	
read	Jules	Verne’s	novels	as	TEs	today	would	
be	strange,	but	at	the	same	time	reader	has	to	
be	 aware	 that	 at	 the	 time	 they	were	written	
they	were	 presented	 as	TE.	Notice	 however	
that	 this	 is	 in	 no	way	 distinctive	 of	 science	
fiction: in order to understand almost any lit-
erary	work,	a	reader	has	to	be	aware	of	certain	
background	 (common	 knowledge	 regarding	
the	 social	 rules,	 political	 regimes,	 religious	
beliefs etc.) shared by the author and his tar-





















different	principles	 from	 the	ones	we	know.	 In	explaining	 the	workings	of	
science	 fiction,	David	Seed	 invokes	Arthur	C.	Clarke’s	 claim	according	 to	
which	 science	 fiction	 can	 challenge	 conservative	mind-sets	 through	 narra-
tively  embodied  thought  experiments.26 This  is  an  important  point  for  our 
research here: the invocation of thought experiments to explain the nature of 
science fiction.











2.2. Sense 2: motivation for particular kind of description
I	think	there	is	a	valuable	lesson	to	be	drawn	from	our	discussion	so	far:	if	
we	are	 to	explain	 the	analogy,	we	 should	consider	 the	aim	of	 constructing	
TEs,	why	is	it	that	they	are	used	in	the	first	place?	J.	R.	Brown	lists	several	
reasons	why	TEs	 are	 postulated,	 and	 these	 include:	 to	 fulfil	 specific	 func-


















































in	19ct	Chicago	or	 in	 the	distant	 future	 in	space)	bears	no	significance	 for	




















Here	 is	 Davies:	 “…	 the	 narratives	 in	 TE’s	
differ	 from	 the	narratives	 in	 standard	works	






ing-believe	 the	 content	 of	 the	 narrative,	 she	
will	come	to	believe	that	 this	 is	how	certain	















the	 reasons	behind	 immoral	behaviour	and	manipulation,	 the	possibility	of	
repentance,	etc.
And	 this	 is,	 it	might	be	claimed,	where	 the	analogy	between	 the	cognitive	




















































































2.4. Sense 4: internal and external perspectives
The	notion	of	 internal	and	external	perspective	as	 I	will	use	 it	here	comes	
from	Peter	Goldie,	from	his	analysis	of	the	way	readers	engage	with	the	non-
actual	as	well	as	actual	events.34	Although	his	focus	is	on	engagement	with	













































be	 like	 for	me	 to	be	 in	 this	 situation	can	be	a	 source	of	knowledge.	Barys	
Gaut	offers	a	powerful	 account	along	 these	 lines,	 in	developing	his	 theory	
of	 learning	 from	 the	 imagination.	What	he	wants	 to	 show	 is	 that	 imagina-
tion	 should	 be	 recognized	 as	 a	 source	 of	 knowledge,	 and	 that	 literature	 is	
particularly	powerful	 in	 governing	 the	process	 of	 imagining.37	But,	 on	 the	

































understanding	–	we	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	 analogy	with	TEs	 explains	 how	
fiction can be  the source of cognitive values. For  literary cognitivists  such 
as	Davies,	this	eliminated	the	hypotheses	problem.	However,	I	think	there’s	
more to be said about the hypotheses.
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Iris Vidmar
Misaoni eksperimenti, hipoteze 
i kognitivna dimenzija književne fikcije
Sažetak
Neki autori brane književni kognitivizam – stajalište da književna fikcija ima spoznajnu vrijed­
nost – povlačeći analogiju između spoznajne vrijednosti misaonih eksperimenata i književne 
fikcije. U ovome ću radu analizirati razloge za ovu analogiju te vidjeti koliko se njen doseg može 
proširiti. U drugome dijelu razmotrit ću tvrdnju književnih antikognitivista prema kojoj književ­
nost u najboljem slučaju može biti samo izvor hipoteza, a ne znanja. Ovu ću tvrdnju dovesti u 
pitanje pokazujući da hipoteze same mogu imati vrijedne spoznajne koristi, u nadi da se na taj 





und kognitive Dimension der literarischen Fiktion
Zusammenfassung
Einige Verfasser verteidigen den literarischen Kognitivismus – einen Standpunkt, nach welchem 
die literarische Fiktion erkenntnismäßig ersprießlich ist – indem sie eine Parallele zwischen 
den Erkenntniswerten der Gedankenexperimente und der Literaturfiktion ziehen. In dieser 
Schrift fasse ich den Vorsatz, die Ursachen für diese Parallelisierung auszukundschaften wie 
auch zu ermitteln, inwieweit sich diese Analogie ausdehnen lässt. In dem zweiten Teil wende ich 
mich der vonseiten der literarischen Antikognitivisten vorgebrachten Behauptung zu, welcher 
zufolge die Lieratur günsigstensfalls eine Hypothesen­ und keineswegs eine Wissensquelle zu 
sein vermag. Ich hinterfrage diese These, indem ich die Anschauung erhärte, dass Hypothesen 
über eigene wertvolle erkenntnisbezogene Vorzüge verfügen können; all dies in der Hoffnung, 








Expériences mentales, hypothèses 
et dimension cognitive de la fiction littéraire
Résumé
Certains auteurs défendent le cognitivisme littéraire – position selon laquelle la fiction littéraire 
a une valeur cognitive – en établissant une analogie entre les valeurs cognitives de l’expérience 
mentale et la fiction littéraire. Dans cet article, j’analyserai les raisons de cette analogie et ver­
rai jusqu’où cette analogie peut s’étendre. Dans la seconde partie, j’examinerai l’affirmation 
des anti­cognitivistes littéraires selon lesquels la littérature peut tout au plus être une source 
d’hypothèses et non pas du savoir. Je mets cette affirmation au défi en montrant que les hypo­
thèses à elles seules peuvent avoir de précieux avantages cognitifs, dans l’espoir de restaurer 
ainsi les avantages cognitifs que les lecteurs tirent de la littérature.
Mots-clés
valeurs	cognitives,	hypothèses,	cognitivisme	littéraire,	réalisme,	science-fiction
